CENTRE for MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST & ISLAMIC STUDIES

Lebanon is a small and internally complicated country, so why should anyone on the outside bother? And since at present it is also tranquil then maybe it is wise just to leave good enough alone. These realities, while true, cannot constitute valid reasons for open-ended benign neglect. Hidden corrosive forces in and around the tiny country are constantly at work, and sudden calamitous setbacks as happened on many occasions in Lebanon's recent past remain a menacing possibility at all times. What sits quietly and unobtrusively on the sidelines could merely out of carelessness find itself sliding into turmoil and thus be swiftly catapulted to center-stage with ugly fallout on the immediate surroundings and possibly far beyond. In this respect Lebanon may not exactly be a ticking time-bomb since it does exhibit a healthy "been there, done that" resilience, but it persists as a delicately cobbled polity with much about it that is unfinished or unresolved, thereby harboring built-in vulnerabilities that are potentially worrisome.

There are many reasons to condemn and agonise over Pakistani Taliban’s wanton attack on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda on 20 January, causing twenty-one deaths and injuring more than thirty people, but two definitely stand out singularly. This private institution of higher learning was named after a great humanitarian and eminent freedom fighter, who avowedly believed in non-violence that he practised even before Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) made it into his unique creed. Khan, a towering and no less charismatic personality, began his long political career during the stormy day of the Khilafat Movement when Indian Muslims were deeply astir over events in the Ottoman caliphate. Exhortations for tolerance, non-violent resistance, modern education and an austere life endeared Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988) across South Asia besides earning him a well deserved title, Bacha Khan—the King Khan. Charsadda was his birth place though the illustrious Khan willed to be buried in Jalalabad underlining his lifelong desire to solidify his ideas among fellow Pashtuns--often derisively called Pathans by the Raj and others. Not only this massacre of two teachers and nineteen students happened on Khan’s death anniversary, it callously took place in his very town as well and presumably the four perpetrators and their backers claiming responsibility for this heinous crime happened to be fellow Pashtuns for whom he had devoted his entire life.

In the post-revolution Tunisia, Hizb al-Nahdah, previously not only persecuted but also compelled to leave the country―found itself in a fresh ambiance. An unexpected reappearance of al-Nahdah (sudden and abrupt as well) shaped as well as dominated the culture of politics in the country. Amid engaged in formulating a pragmatic program aimed at ensuring peace, progress and stability in the country, the Party paid full attention toward expansion and consolidation of its own edifice as well. Its leadership, therefore, followed practically such policies and strategies befitting the Party’s ideological expression. As Bin Ali’s game ended, a new chapter in a new context opened in the history of Tunisia wherein al-Nahdah had an ample opportunity to transform its ‘rhetoric’ that was long in the making into ‘realism’. Mixture of both fortunes and misfortunes is what characterizes al-Nahdah’s hitherto journey.

This essay analyses the thoughts of three (3) Prominent Western Academicians on Islam-Democracy Discourse, namely jurist Khaled Abou El Fadl (b.1963, Kuwait), Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law (USA); political scientist Abdelwahab El-Affendi (b. Sudan), Reader in Politics in University of Westminster (London); and theologian Abdulaziz Sachedina (b. 1942, Tanzania), Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia (USA). These Muslim thinkers/ intellectuals have, along with others, contributed greatly to shape the theoretical understanding of "Islamic democracy" and thus have advanced this decades-old-discourse many steps further. The essay argues that the crucial issue, and the challenge ahead, faced by Muslim intellectuals is to turn the theory of Islamic democracy into a practicality.

Hizb al-Nahdah―officially founded in 1981―witnessed a ‘rebirth’ of its political career in the post revolution Tunisia (March 2011), thereby posing a considerable impact on the political milieu of the region. The restructure and reformation of the Movement besides the devising of new strategies and policies befitting the changing socio-political atmosphere are the key involvements of al-Nahdah. The emergence of Salafis as a new political force obviously demanded al-Nahdah to redefine its role, strategy, and outlook. This has been recently manifested in its role as a mediator between different political actors―Secularists and Salafi groups―which is most difficult and complicated endeavor as per Rashid al-Ghannushi, the primary ideologue of the Movement.

Cataclysmic territorial encroachment by the IS/ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) towards Baghdad and in Iraq's Kurdish region beyond Mosul remains as ascendant as it is in northern Syria despite the aerial attacks and some external assistance to the recently installed Haider al-Abadi administration in Iraq. With the air campaign proving less effective, the United States and other Western allies have accentuated pressure on Turkey to commit its troops on the ground so as to blunt the IS forces. Interestingly, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, the main antagonist for the IS, Ankara and the NATO, may be receptive to the idea of Turkish troops fighting fellow Sunnis so as to provide him both a needed legitimacy and some respite since President Tayyip Erdogan remains a persistent foe for the Baathist regime in Damascus. Concurrently, the Kurds divided across several post-colonial states and often seeking sovereignty and unification, begrudge Turkey for not helping their co-ethnics in Syria and for keeping its involvement limited to strictly settling down displaced Arabs and Kurdish refugees. In the same vein, the Iranians are equally engrossed in this fratricide on the side of a beleaguered Assad and a vulnerable Baghdad regime while poised against the troubadours of a Sunni Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In fact, they are relishing a field day since their favourite Shia Houthis obtained an upper hand in a war torn Yemen. Another major Iranian ally, Hezbollah, is already well-ensconced in Lebanon besides fighting the Sunni opposition to Assad, whereas rest of the world seems to be largely focused on IS's assault on Ain-al Arab (Kobani), a strategic town straddling the Turkish-Syrian borders. If the IS was able to capture this town, it would have the entire swathe of territory from Kirkuk in Iraq to Aleppo and eastern Mediterranean in Syria under its control bestowing it some of the most fertile valleys along with facilitating the munificent export of gas.

Notwithstanding the political boundaries that were successfully concocted by internal clannish and private interests as well as by external hegemonies, the phenomenon of the Social Contract (Ummah), regardless of its constituents or size, still plays a most significant role in propelling hopes for better economic, political and social justice among the disbursed subjects. Such nostalgic hopes turn into apathy and frustration, depending on the prevailing events of the times. If however, the post Arab-Spring experience in Egypt or Libya or Iraq, Yemen or Syria, just to name a few, puts down firm roots over the region, then it goes without saying that a New Middle East, politically and culturally very different from the one we know today, will arise.

More than a year has passed since Abdel Fattah Sisi’s coup d’etat, which led to the ouster of elected President Muhammad Morsi from power. The supporters of the army’s involvement in the political process spoke of a “corrective” movement, that was necessary in order to help the Egyptian people ‘‘save their revolution’’, while President Morsi’s supporters spoke of ‘‘putchists’’ against legitimacy and ‘‘usurpers’’ of 25 January’s legacy. Since then, both sides have clashed politically and ideologically on the streets, the suburbs, the universities, the Press and social media, fiercely defending their claim as protectors of the same revolution.

Large scale acquisitions of land in developing countries by multinational or foreign governments have attracted widespread attention in the global media and have sparked a dynamic debate. On the one hand is the argument that agriculture in developing countries especially in Africa crucially needs investment and that the sector has been neglected by peasants, politicians and businesses alike. On the other hand there are arguments against the process that see it as neo-colonial policy where food is being transported from poor countries, where a large per cent of the population is malnourished, to rich nations. The purpose of this brief report is to present the main arguments of both sides, and argue that a more sustainable approach is needed.

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has frequently remarked that Iran is among the most democratic countries, with open and fair elections since its inception thirty-four years ago. The claim that Iran is a vibrant democracy is based on the fact that Iranians have gone to the ballot box on multiple occasions, voting for presidents, parliamentarians and city council members. The presidential election of June 14th with nearly 73% of the electorate participating is a case in point. However, what makes the Iranian elections non-democratic is the vetting of candidates by the Council of Guardians, consisting of twelve members, six of whom are clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader while the other six are jurists selected by the Parliament.[1] All are conservatives and all profess their loyalty and allegiance to the Supreme Leader.