CENTRE for MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST & ISLAMIC STUDIES

As white smoke was coming out two years ago to signify the formation of a new Hariri government in Beirut, the dangers of an economic collapse, and protracted political and social instability were looming over the country. Now, as white smoke came up again with the formation of Najib Mikati’s government last September, several converging crises have brought the country to its knees. The galloping economic breakdown, precipitated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and last year’s blast in Beirut’s port has created asphyxiating conditions that put Lebanon in completely uncharted waters.

The Iraqi parliamentary elections were held early in response to the 2019 mass protests. The final results have yet to be announced; yet, it appears that the Sadrist movement is the big winner while pro-Iranian militias seem to have suffered the greatest loss. Considering though the lowest voter turnout since Saddam Hussein’s removal in 2003, the very democratic legitimacy of the new government, whose formation process is expected to be lengthy and complex, is under question. Additionally, its fragility is highlighted in the gravity of the challenges it faces: serious socio-economic problems related to the Covid-19, climate change and entrenched corruption.

Pope Francis’ visit to Iraq from 5th to 8th March was significant and highly symbolic. It included the capital Baghdad, the cities of Najaf and Ur as well as various cities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Throughout this trip, the Pope tried to support the Christians of Iraq by making their suffering from the war and their current hardships widely known. He called for the protection of the Christian communities by the government and promoted a dialogue for peaceful coexistence among various religious communities.^[1]

From the rise of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and throughout the Doha peace talks in 2020, a considerable nexus between education and conflict has been predominant. Firstly, the education system has been directly targeted during the hostilities and, secondly, it has been instrumentalized for the purposes of the ongoing conflict, leading to a vicious circle of perpetuation. The Taliban have contextually adapted their education strategies, utilizing education institutions and positioning themselves as an indispensable actor for the present and the future of education in the country, thus showing a significant change, which at the same time might question some of the group’s core values.

The tribal and local leaders, as the key parameters of Libya's social structure, came to the fore in the power struggle for the country. Apart from the west-east divide the preferences of the tribes and their shifting allegiances as well the role of regional powers, such as Algeria and Egypt in particular, must also be taken into account. Recent developments are not particulary promising in terms of ensuring lasting peace and tranquility in a war-torn country. All parties seem determined to maintain their positions as they are still wary of trusting each other and feel underrepresented.

Syria’s north-western region of Idlib remains the stronghold of the opposition forces, with the most prominent jihadist groups operating there, as well as the most committed opposition forces against Assad’s regime. As Aron Lund states, the rebel-held areas are governed by a patchwork of sharia courts, local councils, exile government departments, and direct rule by armed groups. However, instead of forming a unified opposition, those non-state actors are competing against each other for control over Idlib.

This analysis aims at underlining the economic and political crisis in Iraq that led to widespread protests around the country since October 2019. The government’s inability to deliver basic services to society has created a series of protests with demands for better living conditions. The Iraqi security forces and armed militias are using extreme force to tackle the demonstrations with many protesters injured or killed. Hence, the question that presents itself is how foreign interventionism affects the country’s society and sense of security, as well as its economy.

Almost 6 years since the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, the long-term and largely neglected conflict, is still going strong, albeit turning to several internal conflicts between local actors benefiting from the weakness of central government and the numerous divisions of societal and state structures that favor the prevalence of local authorities. Even though frontlines have not changed significantly over the last couple of years and most local actors have established their authority in certain regions, the war has not been called and conflict persists in key areas of the country. In the governorates of Marib, Taiz, Hadramawt and Al- Hudeydah, clashes persist and neither of the two main conflicting parties has consolidated its authority in these areas, despite Houthis gaining significant ground over the last year.

Despite the latest ceasefire in Idlib, tensions are once again rising across Syria. In the northwest, the high mobility in Idlib indicates that renewed fighting is rather a matter of timing, while in the south and east, escalating assassination campaigns in Daraa and Deir ez-Zor generate new dangerous dynamics. In central and eastern Syria, the resurgence of ISIS cells further exposes a severe security vacuum that opens way for intensive influence competition between the Kurds and the regime. Last but not least, the unprecedented economic crisis that face the country threatens to derail even the minimum stability enjoyed in Syria at the moment.

Recently, Israel has improved its relations with the Gulf. This development was formalized via the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain and the silent approval of Saudi Arabia. The normalization between Israel and the Gulf is the result of a process some 20 years in the making, as 27 years have passed since Rabin, Arafat and Clinton signed the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which for the most part is now inactive. The questions that arise are how these accords can potentially affect the regional balance and whether more accords are likely to come.