As the dust settles from Egypt’s so-called “popular coup” on July 3, it has become clear that Egyptian society is deeply polarized. There is a vast gulf between those who supported the army’s actions in removing President Morsi, and those from the Muslim Brotherhood who insist on the illegality of his deposition and demand his reinstatement. In the midst of this standoff, a number of activists have appeared that mistrust both sides, believing that the alternative to Islamic rule is not simply military rule. This article provides an overview of the factors leading to renewed support for the Egyptian military, suggesting considerations for those who see it as a viable alternative to the Brotherhood’s rule.

The Arab Spring swept countries which share many common denominators, one of which is the socioeconomic disparity. Inexorably, political turmoil causes economic havoc. The stability and prosperity of the economies that were affected by the Arab Spring are a major concern to all and sundry; namely to their people, to all the other countries in ME NA that managed to sharply “escape” the Arab Spring and, not to mention, the international community.

On March 19, millions of voters rallied to polling centers to take part in Egypt’s first free and fair elections in nearly six decades. At least 25 million of Egypt’s 40 million eligible voters came out in an unprecedented turnout to cast their vote for a series of amendments to Egypt’s constitution[i], passing the referendum with the endorsement of 77 percent of voters[ii]. Specifically, the amendments limited the presidential term from six to four years, and imposed a two-term limit on each nominee. Newly elected presidents are now required to appoint a vice president within 60 days of resuming office, and presidential authority to declare a state of emergency has been circumscribed. Moreover, an article that empowered the state in the fight against terrorism was abolished due to the huge abuses of power it legitimated under the Mubarak regime. Finally, the referendum supported full judicial supervision of votes, a measure intended to ensure that free, transparent elections are held. The passing of the referendum will effectively pave the way for parliamentary elections to be held in June, followed by the presidential elections in August or September.

The flight BA2886 from London to Tunis on the 30th of January 2011[i] was not just another ordinary air cruise. Among the passengers, over 20 years the exiled Mohammed Ghanouchi, the leader of Nahda party was finally about to step on Tunisian soil, marking the end of Ben Ali’s era. An era which is reshaping the politics of Middle East, known for its sclerotic and archaic regimes. While the triumph of the Arab Street toppling the 23 years Tunisian President surprised many, the world’s attention turned over to the Egyptian protests for more than two weeks, demanding the end to Hosni Mubarak’s presidency who is ruling the country since 23 Jul 1952 and by Emergency Law since 1981.

More than a year has passed since Abdel Fattah Sisi’s coup d’etat, which led to the ouster of elected President Muhammad Morsi from power. The supporters of the army’s involvement in the political process spoke of a “corrective” movement, that was necessary in order to help the Egyptian people ‘‘save their revolution’’, while President Morsi’s supporters spoke of ‘‘putchists’’ against legitimacy and ‘‘usurpers’’ of 25 January’s legacy. Since then, both sides have clashed politically and ideologically on the streets, the suburbs, the universities, the Press and social media, fiercely defending their claim as protectors of the same revolution.

A series of French and foreign scholars and researchers have embarked on an effort to approach a phenomenon that has increased in ìpopularityî since 9/11 in western media, academic communities and thinkñtanks; however, it still remains widely ambiguous. Analyses which focus on extremist movements in the Muslim world quite often use the term ìSalafismî along with ìJihadismî, ìWahhabismî and ìextremist Islamî. This kind of mixing of theological, militant and political terms obscures more than it reveals while confusing the reader and intensifying his or hers already troubled perception of the phenomenon under discussion. This work - the first one to approach the Salafist phenomenon under a global prism - sheds light on the course of salafism from its cradle in the Arabian Peninsula to its apparition in the Parisian suburbs, passing by the Middle Eastern world and particularly Morocco.

Under different circumstances Abu Musíab al-Suri could have been an established academic as he is characterized by strict methodological adherence, intellectual arrogance, inclination to self-citation, strained relations with colleagues and thirst for recognition. Nevertheless, the current international situation renders his candidacy for a university chair out of question. Hence, he rightfully occupies a position in the unofficial intelligencia of militant jihadi Islamism and he holds the undisputed chairmanship in the ëdepartment of strategics. However, more than that and besides his intellectualism, he is an ëadeptí heir of the tradition of field guerrilla warfare theoreticians. If unconventional warfare is doomed to irrelevance in the face of superior technology, organization and intelligence of the modern armies, Suri appears to give it a new breath.

The aim of this essay is to show the way in which the political thought of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb has influenced Islam’s non-religious (mainly social and political, i.e. ideological) aspects. The concepts of religion and ideology will be quickly examined both in relation to Islam and to each other as well, al-Banna’s and Qutb’s political thought will be thematically analysed, while in the end a critique will take place.