The aftermath of the Arab spring not only saw a difficult regime transition in Tunisia and Libya but contributed to the revival of old and new security challenges in the Maghreb and the Sahel. The secessionist conflict that broke out in 2012 in northern Mali, followed by a military coup in Bamako and the French intervention a year later, is paradigmatic of how the fallout effects of the Libyan civil war and the difficult political transitions in Tripoli and Tunis affected the internal stability of neighbouring countries.

This article seeks to explain the absence of legal reasoning behind the inaction in Syria, especially after the imposition of a No-Fly zone in Libya. After briefly explaining the legal framework regarding intervention today, the action in Libya is explained under that framework, while the situation is compared to that in Syria. The main goal of the article is to show that the only possible reasoning behind staying still in front of the massacres committed is basically realpolitik. However, it will be shown that intervention is not and should not by all means be cure-all.  

The Libyan Arab Spring led to the inauguration of a new chapter in the country's history. What is most challenging in the foreseeable future is who is going to be the leading player of the transitional process or else who is going to set the hierarchy of needs in the Libyan state in order to prevent further confrontation and polarization. The rule of law and democratic principles cannot be instilled into Libyan people overnight. Tremendous effort is needed in order to fulfil “the responsibility to protect the civilians”.

As the battle for Bani Walid continues unabated, major questions remain about what the next day of the L ibyan war will look like, not only in the Maghreb but also in a wider regional and international level. As the rebels are still sweeping the country for the last supporters of the regime and the Qadh?fi family, the Sahel is boiling, the Syrian regime staunchly refuses any concession to the protesters and in Yemen a new wave of manifestations has been met with more repression. At the other side of the Mediterranean, the E U has got the hands full into the debt crisis of its poorest members, while China and the US are coping with their own controversies and internal issues respectively.

The revolutions and the uprisings in the Middle East changed the balances in the region and, consequently, Russia’s perspective on it. Russia had to face the risk of losing relatively new gains, as well as dilemmas on which side to favour, especially in the case of Libya and Syria. It can be said that Moscow generally remained a “royal realist,” standing on the side of its interest and trying to adapt its policies to the ad hoc developments. The way Russian policy will develop and the extent to which the already made choices have been successful or not are both still “under process.”